The West is struggling to assess the threats. Here’s how it can improve.

In 1924, while imprisoned in Landsberg Prison following the failed Beer Hall Putsch, Adolf Hitler, a 35-year-old political agitator, began writing his manifesto, Mein kampf. In it, he called for the destruction of the Versailles Treaty, the establishment of a new German Reich through territorial expansion, and the exclusion of Jews from German life.

Fourteen years later, on September 30, 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich to cheering crowds after concluding a meeting with the same Hitler. He waves a signed piece of paper He assured his audience That “peace for our time” had been secured. Chamberlain, an experienced diplomat, believed he had convinced Hitler to abandon the ambitions he had once gone to prison for trying to achieve.

In less than a year, Hitler broke the agreement by invading Poland and launching World War II, effectively activating World War II Same agenda It was placed 14 years ago.

This is not the only example of the West struggling to accurately assess threats, with deadly consequences. But by looking at past mistakes—and successes—we can see ways to improve threat assessment for the future.

Pearl Harbor

Nearly two years after the failed Chamberlain deal, the United States has misjudged a threat of its own.

Washington intercepted Japanese communications and Received warnings That the attack was possible. However, most military leaders believed that Japan would not dare launch a direct strike on American mainland. They were confident that the Asian country would avoid a confrontation that was sure to lead to its destruction. However, Japan’s actions tell a different story. Its occupation of Indochina, the naval mobilization, and Public speaking The “New Order in East Asia” issue has made it clear that it is preparing for a direct clash. On December 7, 1941, 353 Japanese aircraft attacked Pearl Harbor, killing 2,403 Americans and crippling much of the Pacific Fleet.

This prompted the United States to enter World War II and look inward to examine its failures in the period leading up to Pearl Harbor. According to Roberts Commission The main lesson we learned from the events of 1942 was the need to take enemy intentions and public warnings more seriously than before. The belief that Japan would not dare to implement its declared intentions left America unprepared. The fatal consequences of this assumption cannot be ignored. The tragedy highlighted a simple but costly truth: Dismissing explicit threats as bluffs doesn’t make them any less real. It only magnifies the price of error.

Cuban Missile Crisis

In 1962, the Soviet Union began secretly deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba under the cover of reassuring diplomacy. Soviet officials insisted that only defensive weapons were delivered, and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko Personally reassured US President John Kennedy said that Moscow had no intention of placing offensive missiles on the island.

However, the calmness of this denial raised American suspicions. The sudden surge in the number of Soviet cargo ships, troops, and equipment contrasted so sharply with the pacifist language of Soviet diplomats that Washington ordered an intensification of U-2 reconnaissance flights. On October 14, those flights revealed missile sites under construction, confirming that the Soviet promises were deliberate deception. Ironically, Washington has remained more alert because Moscow has never publicly declared its intentions; Unlike Germany and Japan, the absence of open threats made American leaders scrutinize the gap between Soviet words and actions, allowing them to spot danger before it was too late.

The Cuban Missile Crisis indicates this Leaders sometimes respond more effectively when opponents remain silent Paradoxically, explicit declarations of intent may make governments more likely to dismiss threats as posturing.

Operation Desert Shield

In the years between the Cuban Missile Crisis and the collapse of the Twin Towers, the United States faced a series of crises abroad, from the wars in Korea and Vietnam to the hostage-taking in Tehran and the Persian Gulf War—all while trying to uphold the principle of “Pax Americana,” a term used to enforce the Pax Americana. describes The period of relative peace and stability in the Western world after the end of World War II, under the military and economic dominance of the United States.

In the summer of 1990, Saddam Hussein massed Iraqi forces along the border with Kuwait, the center of the world’s energy supply, while US intelligence carefully tracked the buildup. Some regional experts, including Ambassador April Glaspie He doubted That Saddam would risk a full-scale invasion. Glaspie later admitted that she and her colleagues “didn’t think it would go this far,” referring to the occupation of all of Kuwait. But Washington did not reject the threat, describing it as an empty position. When Iraqi tanks entered Kuwait on August 2, the United States responded immediately, launching Operation Desert Shield, deploying forces in Saudi Arabia, and mobilizing a broad international coalition.

Washington’s willingness to prepare for the worst made the difference. And unlike at Pearl Harbor, it treated the looming threat as credible even when some experts doubted it. The contrast with previous failures suggests that success here stems from the hard lessons of the past and a clear vision for strengthening Saddam’s power, which left little room for wishful thinking.

The war on terrorism

In July 1990, Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman (“the Blind Sheikh”) arrived in New York after traveling through Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Sudan, and soon arrived in New York. I became involved In managing the financial and organizational network of Al-Qaeda in the United States. In April 1991, he obtained a green card from the immigration office in Newark, New Jersey.

Despite previous American support for the Afghan mujahideen, Abdul Rahman Publicly denounced The United States issued fatwas permitting robbing banks and killing Americans. In one of his sermons in New York City, he said described Americans are “descendants of apes and pigs, feeding on the tables of Zionists, communists and colonialists.” Two months later, on February 26, 1993, Al Qaeda detonated a truck bomb beneath the World Trade Center, killing six people and wounding more than a thousand.

Five years later, in February 1998, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri Issued A fatwa under the title “Global Islamic Front” stipulates that Americans must be killed “in any country, whether civilian or military.” On August 7 of that year, Al Qaeda carried out near-simultaneous bombings against the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing more than 200 people. During interviews in 1998 and 1999, bin Laden a promise American military forces in the Middle East would be attacked, and in October 2000, al-Qaeda operatives rammed a small boat filled with explosives onto the USS Cole in Yemen, killing 17 American sailors.

Later, in the spring and summer of 2001, US intelligence received repeated warnings that bin Laden was intent on launching an attack inside the United States, culminating on August 6. Daily Presidential Brief Titled “Bin Laden Determined to Strike America.” Just weeks later, on September 11, al-Qaeda operatives hijacked four airliners and carried out the deadliest terrorist attack in modern history, killing nearly 3,000 people.

This failure was not due to a lack of warnings, but rather to a deeper human tendency to dismiss the unthinkable. Leaders and intelligence agencies assumed that Al Qaeda’s threats were merely posturing, and that no group would dare launch such a catastrophic strike against the United States. The tragedy of September 11 thus demonstrates more than just institutional failure. And reveals how The West has repeatedly had difficulty taking overt threats at face value, especially when those threats violate its expectations of rational self-preservation.

Modern conflicts

This unwillingness to take threats seriously has led to some of the greatest tragedies in history—at Pearl Harbor and on September 11, the United States had clear indicators of the enemy’s intentions and capabilities, yet blame thereafter focused primarily on failures of coordination.

A similar dynamic has unfolded in recent years with America’s response to Russian aggression. At the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, Vladimir Putin I declare frankly That Ukraine was not a legitimate state. In 2014, he seized control of Crimea, clearly linking the annexation to his ambition to restore Russian control over the region. In 2021, he followed it up with a book and speeches outline His belief that Ukraine must be returned to Moscow’s authority by force.

Western leaders have largely rejected these public signals, assuming that Putin would not be reckless enough to risk crippling sanctions, economic isolation, and a costly war. Even with the mobilization of Russia Invasion force 150 thousand soldiers stationed in Russia, Belarus and Crimea In early 2022, many European leaders He refused to believe An invasion was imminent. As EU chief diplomat Josep Borrell later said I confess“We were quite reluctant to believe it,” despite dire warnings from the US government.

The same blindness was on display again on October 7, 2023, when Israel, one of the world’s most advanced intelligence powers, ignored evidence of Hamas’ preparations for a deadly attack. In the months leading up to the attack, Hamas conducted public training, broadcast videos, and even revealed its full combat plans, with which Israeli intelligence It was rejected The possibility of an attack, convinced that Hamas would not be reckless enough to wage a war it was certain to lose, and that its open preparations were too public to be taken seriously.

Believing the unthinkable

The surest way to fool a modern democracy is to show it exactly what you are up to. Often, these countries assume that such threats are mere hoaxes or exaggerations, because their own logic struggles to understand that someone would be so blatant. In doing so, they add layers of non-existent nuance and blind themselves to the stated risks from the beginning, convinced that no one would be so reckless or suicidal as to start a fight that both sides know the aggressor cannot win.

This happened when Chamberlain tried to convince Hitler, and it happened again when the United States ignored the warnings of a man screaming from a cave in Afghanistan. The West ignores those who spend years declaring their intentions publicly, while comforting itself by insisting that they do not mean their words.

Not every threat is imminent. Some potential aggressors, such as North Korea, may hint at violence, but stop short of explicitly declaring their intention to attack. Rhetoric becomes dangerous when it is reinforced by consistent ideology, direct public statements over time, and clear preparations for action. From written statements in prisons to the visible movement of troops and weapons toward the battlefield, democracies must be able to identify the signs that mean they need to shift from interpretation to preparation: strengthening defenses, rallying partners, and, above all, preparing to strike first if waiting seems more costly than doing.